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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
A DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S VIEW
By PERCY FOREMANt
T HE DISTINGUISHED PANEL of which I am honored to be a
member consists chiefly of lawyers of every shape and description
-lawyers who are judges, a lawyer who is a Chancellor of one of
America's great Bar Associations, a lawyer who is a teacher, a lawyer
who is a District Attorney, and, to our surprise, a lawyer who is a
journalist. I am just a lawyer who is a lawyer - and I have been
that for longer than I care to, or most of you, can remember. For
more than forty years I've been in the pit looking up at judges, over
at juries, out at newsmen, and, occasionally, down on my client, who
at least at the beginning of the trial was usually in the pit even
deeper than I.
Although I am pleased to participate in a Symposium on "A
Free Press and a Fair Trial," I might note that most of my pro-
fessional life has been concerned with a "Fair Trial and a Free
Client." As a defense lawyer my interest naturally is not in the
abstract concept of a "fair trial." I have no illusions of cold, emotion-
less "justice" mechanically turning out impeccable, even-hand verdicts
which are both fair and correct. What I know and what I thrive on
is that dramatic process where advocates, such as I, are able to fight
as hard as possible to keep the accused from being found guilty by
twelve very human jurors. In this trial by forensic combat, we advo-
cates use, as best we can, our mastery of the facts, our understanding
of jurors and judges, our knowledge of the law, and our own
courage and determination.
It is a bit awesome to have the whole State of Texas, or the
entire Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, committed to the conviction of
your client, but fortunately, our legal system has developed some very
potent tools to aid the defense attorney in this seemingly unequal
conflict. We have fundamental constitutional protections, such as
the accused's privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
confront his accusers, set rules of evidence which are designed to
eliminate unreliable testimony, and most significantly, the presump-
tion of innocence. Moreover, the accused and his advocate are entitled
to an impartial jury - one which makes its determination of the facts
after hearing the evidence produced and the arguments presented in
court - and not one which has made up its mind before the trial has
t LL.B., 1926, University of Texas; Member of the Houston, Texas Bar; Past
President, National Association of Defense Lawyers.
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begun. The defense attorney's responsibility is to convince the jury
of the accused's innocence, or more accurately, to strive to keep the
jury from being convinced of his guilt. This I assure you is very
often difficult. To impose the further burden of attempting to "de-
convince" a jury or juror who "knows" the accused is guilty, is
hardly fair to the advocate and certainly not fair to the defendant.
How does the press affect the defense attorney's task? First, I
want to stress that my relations with the press have been, are, and I
hope will continue to be, extremely cordial. As I noted, I have no
illusion of a trial being some sort of abstract exercise in justice; it is
not a legal equivalent to a laboratory experiment. A criminal trial
is a dramatic, human, and public institution. I can remember that
as a boy the court house impressed me as the chief theatre and school
house of the town. The essential object of the trial is, of course, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the public trial
is also a source of drama and instruction for the community. A
realization by the court, the prosecution and the defense that this is
so should not prevent them from doing their jobs, but rather should
stimulate them to exercise their responsibility all the more carefully.
I do not believe that publicity is presumptively prejudicial or at best
a necessary evil. Justice should have and has traditionally had a
public character, and those of us who are from day to day concerned
with its operation should not only be aware of this but should learn
how to understand and to live with this fact.
As you might discern from my remarks, I am not too concerned
with publicity during a trial. Competent judges and competent counsel
can prevent things from getting out of hand. Dignity and decorum
are not necessarily enhanced by lack of publicity, nor destroyed by
considerable publicity. We all know that some of the most frighten-
ing abuses have taken place in secret hearings, and indeed the con-
stitutional provision for a public trial would seem to indicate that our
forefathers presumed that publicity would help, not hurt, in the quest
for justice.
I therefore cannot see any reason for a blanket prohibition of the
use of television in the court or hearing room. It is true that through
selective editing there could be misrepresentation of what goes on at
the trial, but it is equally true that a reporter's printed story could be
subjected to the same objection. Moreover, a remark which might
be interpreted one way on a printed page may be understood in a
considerably different way when the remark is heard from a speaker
who is at the same time seen by the public. The voice, mannerisms
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and demeanor of the speaker may convey a much more accurate
impression than his mere printed words.
It could be argued that the use of television could adversely affect
witnesses, and even judges and attorneys. But the fact is that no
important public trial is free from public influence upon those who
participate in it - whether they be a witness, judge, juror, or one of
an audience of assorted newspapermen, court house buffs, interested
lawyers, or curious citizens. Indeed, the self-consciousness or desire
on the part of those participating to make a good show is already
present in any major public trial, whether it be conducted with or
without television.
Of course, there can be publicity that is excessive or poorly
handled during the course of a trial. If this occurs it is usually be-
cause of error on the part of the judge, and convictions which might
result from such "circus trials" will, of course, be set aside. This is
not a problem, however, of control of the press but rather of control
of the court.
The publicity which gives me the most concern is the publicity
given to details and facts of the crime before the trial. Confessions,
statements, comments, suppositions - all of which a competent coun-
sel could easily keep out of any trial - may be plastered all over the
papers or on television, convincing the public generally (including
potential jurors) of the "clear cut guilt" of a man who has not yet
had his day in court. None of the accepted means of eliminating
prejudiced jurors who have been exposed to such information really
can be said to work.
To ask a man, "Have you read about this case?" when the very
question implies that if he has you are going to brand him as incapable of
being "fair", will most assuredly cause him to deny any familiarity
with the case. Common experience justifies the defense attorney's
doubt about the accuracy of the answers to such an inquiry. However,
such doubt is minimal compared to the doubt we should have about
the perfect honesty of answers to questions which require a potential
juror to state that he can be fair, when he has admitted to reading
or having heard such publicity.
Such doubts plague the defense lawyer. They terrify him! For
example, in a child abuse case, try to convince a juror - who has
read that the defendant is a convicted rapist, who has read that a
minister (who is not a witness) saw the accused in the act, who
has read the anguished statement of the "victim's" mother, who has
read stern editorials about getting such "mad dogs" off the streets -
that he must limit his impressions of the facts in what might seem
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to him to be a trial bound by pettifogging rules. After such an emo-
tional onslaught, just try to convince Mr. "Reasonable Juror" that
the defendant was merely exercising a constitutional right in not
taking the stand and that he is still entitled to a presumption of
innocence.
Obviously the damage has been done, and you just hope you can
pick up the pieces. But can we prevent the damage from being done? I
am not sure that we can.
The English injunctive system is not suitable to either our con-
stitutional or judicial tradition. The Supreme Court consistently has
been very sensitive to any attempts through the use of injunctions to
muzzle the press. Moreover, there is probably not the faith in the
lower judiciary in the United States that exists in England. We have,
for the most part, an elected judiciary, or politically appointed judges
for limited terms, and a much wider variety of standards for the mem-
bers of our bench than exist in England. Thus, it would seem most
unlikely that we would ever adopt the English practice.
Also, I seriously doubt whether we can rely on the enforcement of
ethical standards by the bar or bench to dry up the sources of such
prejudicial information, or upon the enforcement of professional
journalistic ethics to prevent its publication. The dispute between the
press and the legal profession seems similar to the current battle over
automobile safety: The automobile manufacturers say that they manu-
facture safe cars, but that there are no safe drivers; safety experts
wonder if the cars are safe for those to whom the manufacturer knows
they are to be sold. Criticizing drivers does not make safer cars,
nor does criticizing cars make better drivers. Obviously, some third
party has to make rules for both. Perhaps Judge Smith's proposals'
are a step in the right direction.
However, any attempt to dry up the sources of information will
be met with strong resistance by the press. It is, and will continue to
be, the press's job to dig and dig hard for information. Of course,
the court and the Bar Association could control the kind of information
that a lawyer could divulge, and it is possible that legislative or judi-
cial controls could be imposed on law enforcement officials. It is
difficult, however, to see how witnesses, their relatives and others
can be kept from discussing the case with the news media and thus
have their views published. In fact, one effect of rules regulating law
enforcement officials and lawyers might be that the only information
available to the public is the least reliable; a state of affairs I am sure
that we all wish to preclude.
1. See Smith, A Judicial View, 11 VILL. L. Rtv. 721 (1966).
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As I have stated, it is unlikely that in the name of journalistic
ethics, the press will not print such information as it has available and
will not exploit sensational crime as one of the staples of any lively
daily press. This is especially so if there is no common standard
to bind all of the news media. Although a number of newspapers
voluntarily have agreed to avoid emphasizing the details of any crime
news or to indulge in any sensational reporting, the bulk of the news
media will follow whatever is the most competitively successful path.
Another possibility might be to make those who create an at-
mosphere in which a fair trial cannot take place liable to those - the
defendant, the state, the witnesses - who are inconvenienced or dam-
aged by the delays which may be caused by such publication.
As you will have gathered, I am not too optimistic about ever
"solving" the problem of such conflicts as presently exist between the
principles of a "free press" and a "fair trial." In the final analysis, the
relative competence of a lawyer in dissipating adverse prejudicial pub-
licity, and the fairness with which a judge administers a trial, may be
the only effective protections that are feasible. As I believe I have
pointed out, this may be a very difficult task for both the lawyer and
the judge, but it is one which they have had to perform and which
they have generally accomplished with competence. As soon as an
attorney finds himself presented with such a situation, he should begin
to consider how best to protect his client against adverse publicity.
Under the recent Supreme Court cases,2 it would appear that more
lawyers will be getting into the act at a sufficiently early stage of the
case so that many of the abuses of the past can be eliminated by more
adequate and prompt legal representation.
2. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
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